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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

HONG NGUYEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970483-CA
Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE INTENT ELEMENT OF THE
CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.

The fully marshaled evidence, even when viewed in a light most
favorable

to

the

jury

verdict1,

does

not

establish

Nguyen's

culpable intent to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery on
appeal.

See Appellant's Brief (flA.B.M) at 6-15.

In brief, Nguyen

asserts that the nature of his actions does not evince the intent
necessary to support an aggravated robbery conviction.
v. Bovland, 495 P.2d

315, 316

(Utah 1972)

See State

(robbery conviction

sustained only upon requisite showing of intent); A.B. at 8.

His

conduct did not arise to the level of egregious, violent, armed
behavior contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute and prior
case law.

See State v. Castonquay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983)

(an act itself does not establish intent; intent may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp.
1

The appellant bears the burden of marshaling the
and then showing that such evidence does not support the
conviction. See State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah
1992). When a conviction is challenged for insufficient
evidence, the reviewing court shall view the evidence in
most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Verde,
116, 124 (Utah 1989) .

evidence
App.
a light
770 P.2d

1997)

(robbery); § 76-6-302

(aggravated robbery); A.B. at 8-9.

Moreover, his conviction does not serve the statutory distinction
between "aggravated" offenses and less serious conduct, nor the
corollary deterrent purpose in "discouraging violent behavior in
the commission of an otherwise nonviolent crime."

State v. Seel,

827 P.2d 954, 962 (Utah App. 1992); see also A.B. at 12-13.

Hence,

Nguyen asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the
aggravated robbery conviction.
The State, however, maintains that the evidence is sufficient
to support the verdict.
brief,

the

State

See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 5-8.

discusses

the

elements

of

the

In its

offense

of

aggravated robbery and then asserts that the conviction is sound
because the facts established at trial satisfy those elements.

Id.

In so doing, the State discounts Nguyen's opening brief argument,
stating that it "misses the point" in discussing intent and fails
"to address the statutory elements of the crime."
A.

Id. at 8-9.

The Argument In Nguyen's Opening Brief Does Not "Miss The
Point" As The State Asserts.

Contrary to the State's assertion, Nguyen's contentions in his
opening brief do not "miss the point."
element

of

aggravated

robbery

Castonguav, 663 P.2d at 1326.

that

Id. at 9.

must

be

Intent is an

proved

at

trial.

Indeed, the robbery statute itself

requires that the person act "intentionally or knowingly."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1) (b) (Supp. 1997).

See

The Utah Supreme

Court explained that "intent [] must be proved before the conduct
may be said to be culpable."

Castonguav, 663 P.2d at 1326.

Where, as here, direct evidence of a suspect's state of mind
2

is lacking,

intent or

lack thereof

is established

analysis of the circumstantial evidence.
regard

to

aggravated

robbery,

the

Id.

through an

With particular

discussion

should

include

assessment of the "acts and conduct of the accused, the nature of
the weapon used . . . and the manner in which it was used, taken
together with all the other circumstances in the case."
Maestas,

652

P.2d

903,

906

(Utah

1982)

(citation

State v.
omitted),

partially overruled on other grounds by State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d
843, 848 n.5 (Utah 1992) . Accordingly, in order to demonstrate the
insufficiency of the evidence regarding his state of mind, Nguyen
had to discuss how the circumstantial evidence and the nature of
his

actions

did not

arise

to the

level

of

egregious

conduct

contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute and thereby failed
to evince

culpable

intent.

See A.B. at

6-15.

Accordingly,

Nguyen's discussion in his opening brief is appropriate and does
not "miss the point."2
B.

S.B. at 9.

The Evidence Does Not Support The Inference That Nguyen
Acted With The Intent Necessary To Sustain The Aggravated
Robbery Conviction.

The State asserts that all the elements of robbery have been
2

In his opening brief, Nguyen refers to an alleged set of
keys. See A.B. at 12 n.7. The State mischaracterizes Nguyen's
brief discussion about the keys as supporting his more general
argument regarding intent, and instead notes that the keys go to
the issue of identity. See S.B. at 4 n.3. Actually, Nguyen
specifically states, in accordance with the State, that the keys
go to the perpetrator's identity. See A.B. at 12 n.7. Nguyen,
however, notes that Carper's inconsistent testimony regarding the
keys raises concerns about the sufficiency of the testimony in
addition to the concerns already present regarding the evidence
in support of intent. Id. Accordingly, Nguyen's reference to
the keys is not a misplaced attempt to demonstrate his lack of
intent.
3

satisfied since Nguyen was stealing the stereo from Carper's car
when Nguyen waived the screwdriver at Carper in his attempt to flee
the scene.

See S.B.at 5-6; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-3 01

(Supp. 1997)

("[a]

person commits robbery if

. . . the person

intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force
against another in the course of committing a theft").
further

asserts

that

the

robbery

is

aggravated

The State
since

the

screwdriver constituted a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of the
aggravated robbery statute.

S.B. at 7; see also Utah Code Ann. §

76-6-302 (1995) ("[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing a robbery, he . . . uses or threatens to use
a dangerous weapon").
From

this

evidence,

the

State

claims

that

Nguyen

acted

"'intentionally or knowingly,'" as required for a conviction of
aggravated robbery.

See S.B. at 6-7.

Such evidence, however, does

not support the inference that Nguyen acted with culpable intent.
See, A.B. at 6-15; see also Castonquay, 663 P.2d at 1326 (inference
of intent must be supported by circumstantial evidence).

An "act

in itself does not raise the presumption that it was done with the
specific intent required to prove the offense."
P. 2d

at

1326.

A

person

acts

intentionally

Castoncruay, 663
when

"it

is

his

conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)

knowingly

"with

respect

to

his

conduct

(1995).
or

the

A person acts
circumstances

surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances."
4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

103 (2) .3
The circumstantial evidence does not establish that Nguyen
acted with a "conscious objective" to threaten Carper, or even an
"awareness of his conduct."
from Carper's person.

First, Nguyen did not seize the car

Rather, he approached the car while it was

unattended in a deserted lot, suggesting that he sought to avoid
people.
which

He did not even bring a weapon, such as a gun or a knife,

might

encounter.

otherwise

indicate

See

at

A.B.

that

11-12.

he

anticipated

Rather,

Nguyen

only

screwdriver, which he was using to loosen the stereo.
see A.B. at 9-13.
menacingly

an

armed
had

a

R.Ill [69];

Hence, Nguyen was taken by surprise when Carper

confronted

him by verbally

accosting

him

and

then

kicking him in the chest after Nguyen exited the car and was trying
to flee.

R. Ill [49-50, 69-71] . Taken off-guard and in the heat of

the moment, Nguyen intuitively waived the screwdriver in order to
escape Carper's obvious rage.

Such an intuitive reaction, without

more, cannot be fairly described as "conscious" or "intentional."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (defining "intentional").

Moreover,

Nguyen's reaction cannot be described as "knowing;" given the swift
occurrence of events and his intuitive reaction, Nguyen could not
have been

"aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing

circumstances."

Utah

Code

Ann.

3

§

76-2-103(2)

(defining

The second half of § 76-2-103(2) provides that a person
acts knowingly "with respect to a result of [the] conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result." Given that Nguyen's actions did not "result" in any
injury to Carper or other damage, this portion of the statute
does not pertain to the present discussion of intent.
5

"knowingly").4
Finally, the State attacks Nguyen's assertion in his opening
brief that the instant conviction does not serve the statutory
distinction
conduct,

between

nor

the corollary

violent behavior
crime."

"aggravated"

See

offenses

deterrent

and

purpose

less
in

"discouraging

in the commission of an otherwise

A.B.at

12-14

(citing

aggravated

egregious

nonviolent

robbery

cases

demonstrating the sort of violent, depraved behavior contemplated
by aggravated robbery statute).

The State concedes that Nguyen's

conduct "falls outside the popular stereotype of aggravated robbery
as a stickup."
conviction

S.B. at 9.

comports

with

It nonetheless maintains that Nguyen's
the

statutory

distinction

between

aggravated offenses and less egregious conduct," contending that
Nguyen "used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon" in violation
of one of the
robbery."

"legislatively enumerated

factors of

aggravated

S.B. at 10. The State further argues that the "jury was

not, and should not have been, asked to determine how 'egregious'

4

The State criticizes Nguyen's depiction of Carper as the
aggressor, stating that it "fails to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict." S.B. at 9 n.7.
Nguyen discusses Carper's aggressive behavior, however, to
demonstrate how Nguyen did not behave in a manner typical of
those who commit aggravated robbery. In most instances, the
actor is the aggressor and the victim is the weaker of the two
who tries to escape but cannot due to the actor's show of force.
In this situation, however, Nguyen was arguably threatened by
Carper, who was large and confrontational toward Nguyen. Indeed,
Carper would not allow Nguyen to flee, but rather told him to
stop. Nguyen was therefore prompted to waive the screwdriver.
Given Carper's own aggressive behavior, Nguyen's reaction
resulted more from fear and a desire to escape than an
intentional or knowing attempt to use coercive force against
Carper.
6

they believed defendant's conduct to be."

Id.

Nguyen does not suggest that the jurors should have been
allowed to make their own subjective determination of egregiousness
in this case.

Id.

Rather, Nguyen makes this argument to assist

this Court in assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to
support Nguyen's conviction.

Reviewing courts historically cite

statutory distinctions and legislative purpose in deciding whether
a particular disposition is appropriate in a given case.

See,

e.g., State v. Suniville 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987)(conviction
for aggravated robbery where defendant used menacing gesture plus
verbal threat instead of gun did not serve statutory distinction
between robbery and aggravated robbery) ; State v. Farrow, 919 P. 2d
50

(Utah App. 1996)

(upholding warrantless arrest of domestic

violence suspect under Domestic Violence Act based on context of
legislation,

legislative

Children's Aid

Soc'v,

intent, and public policy); Wells v.

681 P.2d

199, 208

(Utah 1984)

(holding

analysis of whether father had "reasonable opportunity" in each
individual adoption case to comply with statutory
"would

frustrate

the

statute's

purpose

to

requirements

facilitate

secure

adoptions by early clarification of status"); State v. Scieszka,
897

P.2d

1224,

1227

(Utah

App.

1995)

("fundamental

rule

of

statutory interpretation requires that a statute 'be looked at in
its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to
be accomplished'")

(quotation omitted).

Hence, consideration of

similar information is relevant and valuable to the instant case.
Such information may not be dispositive, but it provides valuable
7

guidance in close cases where, as here, the evidence does not
overwhelmingly

evince

a

culpable

intent

to

commit

aggravated

robbery.
Based on the foregoing and contrary to the State's assertion
in its brief, Nguyen's actions do not evince either an intentional
or knowing state of mind as required for an aggravated robbery
conviction.

See A.B. at 6-15.

The jury could not have reasonably

concluded that Nguyen acted with the requisite intent where he
approached an unattended vehicle, did not carry a weapon of force,
such as a gun or knife, and only waived the screwdriver after
Carper

menacingly

confronted

Nguyen

and

blocked

his

escape.

Accordingly, Nguyen's conviction fails for insufficient evidence
since the circumstantial evidence does not support the inference
that he acted knowingly or intentionally as required by statute.
Id.
II.

NGUYEN'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGEMENT
ENTERED FOR THE INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY OF A
VEHICLE.

Since Nguyen's

conviction

is not

supported

by

sufficient

evidence, Nguyen requests this Court to exercise its authority
pursuant to Section 76-1-402(5), Utah Code Annotated

(1995), and

reverse the conviction for aggravated robbery, then enter judgment
for the lesser included offense of burglary of a vehicle, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-205

(1995) .

See A.B. at 15-16; see also State v.

Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674, 676

(Utah 1982); State v. Bolsinger, 699

P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985).

8

CONCLUSION
Nguyen respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient evidence and enter
judgment for burglary of a vehicle.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument.

SUBMITTED this c2%~tt

day of April, 1998.

CATHERINE L. BEGIC
°
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG
DAVID V. FINLAYSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

9

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, CATHERINE L. BEGIC, hereby certify that I have caused to
be delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 450 S. State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-023 0, and four copies to the Utah Attorney
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this
JZE-6JL day of April, 1998.

CATHERINE L. BEGIC

3

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Attorney
General's Office this

day of April, 1998.

10

